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Coolhunting the Law
Mark Fenstert
"I consult on design." Then, because this is not exactly the
stuff of interesting conversation: "And I hunt 'cool,' although I
don't like to describe it that way. Manufacturers use me to keep
track of street fashion..."
"[T]he 'cool' part - and I don't know why that archaic usage
has stuck, by the way - isn't an inherent quality. It is like a tree
falling, in the forest..."
"What I mean is, no customers, no cool. It's about a group
behavior pattern around a particular class of object. What I do
is pattern recognition. I try to recognize a pattern before anyone
else does ... [And] I point a commodifier at it."
- WILLIAM GIBSON, PATTERN RECOGNITION 86 (2003)
William Gibson's novel Pattern Recognition follows Cayce Pol-
lard, a branding savant and "coolhunter."' Cayce's singular abilities,
which appear preternatural and are characterized as "a morbid and
sometimes violent reactivity to the semiotics of the marketplace,"2
are two-fold: she can determine whether a particular trademark or
brand will be successful merely by looking quickly at a drawing of it,
and she can identify those products or designs that are likely to make
the jump from early adopters to the mass market. She hires these
talents out to marketers of consumer goods hoping to capture the im-
mense profit potential in mainstreaming the new and the hip, as well
t Associate Professor, Levin College of Law, University of Florida. Thanks to
Vic Fleischer for the invitation, to Laura Heymann for comments, and to Trysh Travis
for discussions and corrections.
1. The term "coolhunter" seems to have emerged first in the 1990s, especially as
a service relied upon by entrants in fast-changing sectors in highly competitive con-
sumer markets such as fashion. See Malcolm Gladwell, The Coolhunt, THE NEW
YORKER, Mar. 17, 1997. A "species" of corporate consultant that saw the peak of its
popularity in the late 1990s, the "coolhunter" has apparently died, its job having been
made impossible by an increasingly complicated and fast-moving popular culture,
while its tasks are now performed by savvier corporate employees and journalists who
are able to develop the expertise over which coolhunters once claimed a monopoly.
See This Blog Sits at the Intersection of Anthropology and Economics, http://
www.cultureby.com (June 2, 2006). My use of the term is not intended to refer to this
now-extinct species. Rather, like Gibson's novel, I will invoke the fanciful idea that
there is a "cool" that exists and that it can in fact be "hunted."
2. WILLIAM GIBSON, PATTERN RECOGNITION 2 (2003).
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as to capture the imaginations and discretionary spending of mass
consumers. She hunts the cool, and her personal and professional life
seems itself to be the essence of cool - no office, no paperwork, no
bureaucracy (except for immensely proficient assistants who provide
her with limit-free credit cards and first-class airplane tickets), and
clients in awe of her talents. Cayce represents a fantasy of the pro-
fessional knowledge worker in a service economy. Perhaps it goes
without saying that her work bears little resemblance to legal prac-
tice, at least as I have seen and experienced it.
In this Essay, I want to use the image of the "coolhunter" to con-
sider what Victor Fleischer has called the "branding moments" in a
corporation's legal life - specifically, those events, most notably in in-
itial public offerings, in which a company, with the assistance of
counsel, uses its legal infrastructure and corporate transactions to
further its brand. Fleischer is especially interested in the role that
attorneys play in these events when they introduce and extend the
corporate brand in the innovative documents of corporate governance
that they draft. In a sense, Fleischer wants us to consider the lawyer
either as coolhunter or as drafter of the cool - as the artisan of legal
forms and practice who can engage with and further a commodifiable
pattern, the brand, as well as accomplish the client's specific legal
goals. Of course, legal forms and practices, like branded products,
are themselves commodities, while lawyers and their firms them-
selves are branded, though in more subdued patterns than most of
their clients. However, what Fleischer's work in this area and the
MasterCard case study offer are instances in which the attorney's
work, in addition to clearing legal and regulatory hurdles and produc-
ing a functional and perhaps even somewhat creative legal entity and
set of ongoing relationships, accomplishes some other purpose. The
additional value for the client it creates, which I will call the brand-
ing increment, furthers a goal or goals that are not part of the specific
transaction with which legal labor conventionally concerns itself.
The transaction's creativity goes beyond the formal boundaries of le-
gal doctrine and practice. It aspires to the cool.
My contentions are theoretical and, more tentatively, normative.
In order to analyze and evaluate legal coolhunting for the branding
increment, I suggest that both the "brand" and the multiple audi-
ences towards whom the brand is intended - the audiences whose
attention and interest will in turn create the branding increment -
need to be more thoroughly theorized. Put another way, describing
what lawyers are doing or prescribing what they should be doing in a
particular case like the MasterCard IPO, or making some normative
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claim about the larger value of this mini-trend within some utilita-
rian or ethical or political calculus, or even offering some regulatory
framework within which these corporate structures or contractual re-
lations should be contained - any of these requires us to better recog-
nize our assumptions about the two parts of these transactions'
equation. On one side lies the mysterious process of branding, into
which both companies and their customers pour significant quanti-
ties of meaning in hopes of achieving equally significant effect. As I
explain below, there is no Cayce Pollard in the art and science of
branding, nor is there likely to be a Cayce Pollard of the legal cool-
hunt.3 On the other side lie the audiences for the branded component
of the deal. They include not only consumers but also investors,
shareholders, and, in the MasterCard case study, regulators. And in
between lies the corporate client, who is bound by law, regulation,
and ethical norms to be transparent to some of these audiences - al-
though less so, interestingly, to the client's consumers. Alongside the
client is the attorney, who is at once helping the client comply with
its legal, regulatory, and ethical duties, and, in the instances
Fleischer has identified, hunting the legal cool.
Attorneys appeared to play only background roles in the brand-
ing moments Fleisher has identified elsewhere. 4 In those, companies
sought to dress their transactions and contracts in stylish, attractive
garb: Google was the largest and most prominent company to use the
Dutch auction for its IPO, fashioning itself as a vanguard of a "Silicon
Valley populism" that stood ready to trump the button-down capital-
ists of Wall Street;5 Ben & Jerry's attempted to invoke a similar,
though geographically distinct (Vermont-ish) populism by geographi-
cally limiting their IPO to local residents; 6 and Apple sought to ex-
press a sense of collectivity and coolness by paying Steve Jobs, its
star CEO, only one dollar per year.7 In the MasterCard IPO, how-
ever, Fleischer argues that lawyers played a key role not merely in
3. One interesting question is, if there were a Cayce Pollard of legal branding,
would the cool attorney gain sufficient notoriety to allow her to brand herself? The
fictional Cayce Pollard is a noted coolhunter-for-hire, and the fluidity of marketing
talent is quite distinct from the stickiness of legal employment relationships and the
typical subsumption of legal talent within the law firm. However, the branding of
legal talent within the legal profession, as interesting a topic as it is, is beyond the
scope of this essay.
4. See Victor Fleischer, Brand New Deal: The Branding Effect of Corporate Deal
Structures, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1581 (2006).
5. Id. at 1596.
6. Id. at 1610-11.
7. Id. at 1618-19.
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regulatory cost engineering, but in crafting the deal's branding ele-
ment.8 The attorney is more than a scribe, or even an engineer, com-
municating with other members of the legal trade; she seeks to
communicate and extend the nebulous concept of the client's con-
sumer brand, and to render it in a meaningful, attractive, and cool
way to the consumer.
However, to figure the roles and interests of the attorney and
client, we need a better sense of the brand and the audiences. This
Essay is a small effort to use Fleischer's work to think through these
issues by focusing, in turn, on branding, on the various audiences for
these branding moments, on the relationship between the brand and
transparency norms, and, finally, on the role of the attorney in this
process.
BRAND
A representative marketing textbook offers the following defini-
tion of "brand": "a name, term, symbol or design, or any combination
of them which is intended to identify the goods and services of one
seller or group of sellers and to differentiate them from those of com-
petitors."9 The term refers both to a material thing, the physical
marker of the brand itself (as it is seen or spoken or heard), and to
the functions that a brand is intended to serve. The concept of
"brand" thus incorporates two elements of a broader theory of com-
munication. First, it includes a theory of signification that would ex-
plain how the name, term, symbol or design produce meaning for the
producer and consumer. Second, it implies a theory of effects regard-
ing what the brand owner intends the brand to perform upon the
product and consumer, and what it actually does perform.
The latter is clearly the more significant aspect of the brand for
its owner. An aesthetically pleasing or innovative brand might pro-
vide some satisfaction for ownership, management, and employees,
but an effective brand increases sales. Branding is meaning-making
with a purpose, an intentional form of communication that seeks to
produce certain cognitive and emotional effects upon its audience,
and to lead that audience to engage in very specific acts - namely, the
consumption of the product or service to which the brand refers. The
brand's intended cognitive and emotional effects include heightening
the audience's awareness of a product and its brand name, increasing
8. See Victor Fleischer, The MasterCard IPO: Protecting the Priceless Brand, 12
HARv. NEGOT. L. REV. 152-53 (2007).
9. PHILIP KOTLER, MARKETING MANAGEMENT 482 (1991).
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consumers' perception of the quality of the offered product or service
as well as their loyalty to the brand, and shaping the mental and
emotional associations that customers make with the brand. 10 It is
perhaps no wonder that early- and mid-twentieth century fears of ad-
vertising's effects, and the effects of mass culture generally, fre-
quently analogized it to propaganda."
Put in its simplest form, the owner ultimately hopes that the
brand will build value into the products to which it is attached
through consumers' reliance on the brand for product identification,
purchase, and satisfaction. 12 The value manifests itself in two
senses: First, in the premium that its owner can charge above what a
generic or private brand can offer for a similar product; and second,
in the relative market share of the branded product in the relevant
product market, which indicates the extent of the brand's effect on
customer decision-making. 13 A successful brand will both command
a high premium and control significant market share. 14 In this way,
successful brands offer "brand equity," an intangible asset with a
fuzzily measurable value that can, in some instances, represent a sig-
nificant portion of a corporation's overall value. 15
This all seems straightforward. However, the brand's effects and
ability to add value come into being as a result of signification.
Brands require symbolic form - indeed, as Roland Barthes explained,
something as "mythical" in its communicative abilities as a brand or
advertisement "is not defined by the object of its message, but by the
way it utters its message." 16 Because of the complex and ambiguous
10. DAVID A. AAKER, BUILDING STRONG BRANDS 7-8 (1996).
11. On the history of this analogy as it pertains not only to advertising but to
mass, commercial culture, see generally PAUL R. GORMAN, LEFr INTELLECTUALS AND
POPULAR CULTURE IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICA (1996); Mark Fenster, Murray
Edelman, Polemicist of Public Ignorance, 17 CRITICAL REV. 367 (2005). Perhaps un-
surprisingly, members of the legal academy took the analogy and ran with it. See,
e.g., Ralph S. Brown, Jr., Advertising and the Public Interest: Legal Protection of
Trade Symbols, 57 YALE L.J. 1165, 1165-69 (1948).
12. AAKER, supra note 10, at 10.
13. DAVID A. AAKER, DEVELOPING BUSINESS STRATEGIES 164-65 (6th ed. 2001).
14. Vijay Vishwanath & Jonathan Mark, Your Brand's Best Strategy, in HARVARD
BUSINESS REVIEW ON BRAND MANAGEMENT 169, 171-72 (1999).
15. See DAVID A. AAKER, MANAGING BRAND EQUITY 14-16 (1991). On the tremen-
dous growth in brand equity over the past five decades, see Carol A. Corrado, Charles
R. Hulten & Daniel E. Sichel, Intangible Capital and Economic Growth 42 (Nat'l Bu-
reau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 11948, 2006), available at http://
www.nber.org/papers/w1l948 (Table 2) (estimating rise in brand equity investment
from $5.3 billion in the 1950-59 period to $160.8 billion in the 2000-03 period).
16. ROLAND BARTHES & ANNETTE LAVERS, MYTHOLOGIES 109 (Annette Lavers
trans., 1972).
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cultural forms that branding takes, the brand often fails in its com-
municative mission by providing an insufficient or excess quantity of
its intended effects. 17 The relative certainty with which the litera-
ture describes the brand's character, effects, and value disappears
when professionals and academics attempt to explain precisely how
brands work, and how to create effective ones. The literature on
branding reveals that it is much easier to analyze brands after the
fact, in post-mortem case studies of their significance and effects,
than to construct a new brand or to project a brand's success by pre-
dicting how the brand's form will act in the cultural imagination as
well as in the marketplace.
Indeed, experts seem to differ over precisely what accounts for a
brand's success. On the one hand, we are told that the successful
brand must be more than just simple - it must be "oversimplified" in
order to cut through the clutter of an overloaded marketplace.' 8
However, we are also told that the brand must have a "personality"
that contains and expresses demographic categories and classic
human traits, 19 and that exemplifies the (presumably attractive)
"core values" of its corporate owner. 20 In other words, it must be both
simple and remarkably complicated and evocative. And leading aca-
demics and practitioners explain a brand's success in a myriad of dis-
tinct and often contradictory ways. It may be due to the exogenous
cultural and historical factors that the brand developer exploits;2 ' or
perhaps it results from the fact that the brand and product exploit
diverging product categories; 22 or perhaps the brand is able to meet
"higher," complex consumer needs for such things as safety, love, es-
teem, and belonging;23 or perhaps it is the result of an interaction of
consumers' understandings and experiences with the product and the
icons, metaphors, phrases, and story of the brand;24 or perhaps it is
17. On the uncontrollable nature of brands and trademarks, see generally ROSE-
MARy J. COOMBE, THE CULTURAL LIFE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTIES: AUTHORSHIP, AP-
PROPRIATION, AND THE LAW (1998).
18. AiL RIES & JACK TROUT, POSITIONING: A BATTLE FOR YOUR MIND 8 (1981).
19. AAKER, supra note 10, at 141-42 (1996).
20. MIKE MOSER, UNITED WE BRAND 11-31 (2003).
21. See DOUGLAS B. HOLT, How BRANDS BECOME ICONS: THE PRINCIPLES OF CUL-
TURAL BRANDING 35-38 (2004).
22. See AL & LAURA RIES, THE ORIGIN OF BRANDS: DISCOVER THE NATURAL LAW OF
PRODUCT INNOVATION AND BUSINESS SURVIVAL 17-37 (2004).
23. See SCOTT BEDBURY & STEPHEN FENICHELL, A NEW BRAND WORLD: EIGHT
PRINCIPLES FOR ACHIEVING BRAND LEADERSHIP IN THE 21ST CENTURY 13-14 (2002).
24. See GERALD ZALTMAN, How CUSTOMERS THINK: ESSENTIAL INSIGHTS INTO THE
MIND OF THE MARKET 227-31 (2003).
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merely the effects that a distinctive visual form have on the visual
perception and cognitive sequences of consumers. 25
From the literature, one can glean three stylized alternatives for
explaining a brand's success. A brand may have great historical
agency and be able, because of its unique and powerful ability to sig-
nify in the contemporary marketplace and culture, to cut its own way
through the clutter of competing products and marketing strategies
to sell an easily substitutable product. Or perhaps a brand merely,
and mostly through random luck, appears at the right time and is
able to offer an informational and symbolic message that both con-
nects with its cultural and historical context and assists in selling a
superior product. Or third, and both most likely and most promi-
nently in the literature, a successful brand results from some combi-
nation of agency and circumstance. It successfully harnesses extant
myths and symbols circulating at a particular moment in order to
respond to and in turn shape consumers' perceptions of their needs or
desires, and ultimately to sell a particular product or service.26 Even
then, a brand can only work when it is consistent with customers'
"personal experiences" with the product - a factor over which the
brand owner has significantly less control than in the design, produc-
tion, and placement of the brand.27
This third explanation also acknowledges the limited agency of
the brand and marketing strategies in shaping consumer decision-
making, and as such makes the most common sense. However, it is
also incoherent and indeterminate. Of course brands must accom-
plish something - if they did nothing to us, we would not remember
them apart from the products they signify, and marketers would not
knowingly waste an enormous amount of capital and energy on devel-
oping brands and exploiting them. And of course brands cannot ac-
complish everything - if they did, then no brands would fail and no
one would change brands because they were dissatisfied with product
performance. However, where, in the vast continuum between
powerlessness and omnipotence, do brands lie in our cultural imagi-
nation and consumer practices? And if, as is obvious, different brand-
ing campaigns end up at quite different points on that continuum,
how and why do they get there?
25. See ALINA WHEELER, DESIGNING BRAND IDENTITY: A COMPLETE GUIDE TO CRE-
ATING, BUILDING, AND MAINTAINING STRONG BRANDS 6-7 (2003).
26. See HOLT, supra note 21, at 6-10; JAMES B. TWITCHELL, BRANDED NATION 17-
21 (2004).
27. Erich Joachimstahler & David A. Aaker, Building Brands Without Mass Me-
dia, in HARVARD BUSINESS REVIEW ON BRAND MANAGEMENT 1, 14 (1999).
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Reviewing this literature and its largely failed efforts to explain
and domesticate the branding process, it is difficult to avoid the con-
clusion that branding is an unpredictable, even magical process in
which the seemingly arbitrary symbol becomes naturalized as it asso-
ciates a product with a set of non-material, often unrelated attrib-
utes.28 Indeed, a century after the idea of the unified and coherent
"corporate image" was initially developed, 29 we can come only some-
what closer to understanding how and under what conditions brand-
ing works, and why some efforts will succeed while others fail. As a
general matter, we know that branding serves an'extraordinarily im-
portant function within an advanced capitalist economy. We can
track its value-creation and either applaud its ability to move product
and captivate our imaginations, or condemn its role in exploiting us
and degrading our lives. However, given not only the lack of consen-
sus among marketing professionals and academics about how and
why it works, but also the complicated, competing, and contested the-
ories of cognition, semiotics, and media effects that also attempt to
explain it, branding remains a (relatively) dark art of marketing.30
I draw three implications from this. First, Fleischer's approach
here and in his earlier article correctly agrees with experts in this
dark art that a case study method focusing on a single company's
concentrated efforts to create or enhance its brand equity likely does
a better job of illuminating the complexity of the branding process
than do efforts to theorize, explain, and produce an abstract approach
or how-to manual. 31 Second, branding efforts are uncertain, risky en-
deavors. No branding boilerplate exists; no authoritative treatise
stands ready to reveal the timeless principles of brand-making; no
Westlaw search will find the model brand that is on-point. Third,
through their use of symbolic, mythical, emotion-laden communica-
tion, branding efforts do more than communicate information about
product attributes to consumers. They may inform, but they must
supplement that information with evocative, indeterminate meaning
whose success can rarely be predicted beforehand.
28. See BARTHES, supra note 16, at 129.
29. See STUART EWEN, ALL CONSUMING IMAGES 211-15 (1988).
30. See generally ZALTMAN, supra note 24, at 47-71 (presenting cognitive theories
of marketing); JUDITH WILLIAMSON, DECODING ADVERTISEMENTS: IDEOLOGY AND MEAN-
ING IN ADVERTISING (1978) (presenting semiotic theory of advertising); DENIS MC-
QUAIL, MCQUAIL'S MASS COMMUNICATION THEORY 35-90 (4th ed. 2000) (summarizing
competing theories of mass communication).
31. See David A. Aaker, The Saga of Brand Equity -A Personal History, in PRO-
CEEDINGS OF THE 14TH PAUL D. CONVERSE SYMPOSIUM 1, 10-11 (James D. Hess & Kent
B. Monroe eds., 1998).
Coolhunting the Law
This final point needs elaboration. Leading marketing propo-
nents (professional and academic) assume that a fundamental irra-
tionality or emotional vulnerability of the consumer is necessary for
branding to be a valuable practice.32 One need not seek confirmation
only from leftist cultural critics of advertising's tendency to prey on
consumers' worst, most irrational human emotions, or of its further-
ance of the worst excesses of capitalism 33 - the literature on branding
and marketing cheerfully admits as much (although without the crit-
ics' normative bite decrying the exploitation and resulting alienation
of the consumer). At the heart of the branding concept is the notion
that an audience of consumers will respond to the brand's symbolic
communication, and that this communication will include something
more than information about the branded product's function and at-
tributes. Accordingly, an analysis of how branding works in a partic-
ular context requires a theory of branding - how it signifies, what
kind of effects it has, what that "something more" that branding pro-
duces actually is.
AUDIENCES
The audience serves as the ultimate commodity of mass, adver-
tising-financed media. Whether the audience is measured by raw
numbers, narrow demographics, or the level of attention it gives, its
elusive gaze forms the basis for the price paid by advertisers for a
broadcast spot, printed page, page view, or other measurable quan-
tity.34 Presumably, a successful effort to further brand identity and
brand equity in corporate transactions adds value by reaching and
affecting two different sets of audiences. First, media coverage of a
corporate deal's branding element addresses the relevant market for
the corporation's products and services. When Google and Ben &
Jerry's used their IPOs as branding moments, they were presumably
hopeful that their efforts would work in conjunction with their more
traditional efforts to market their brand in order to increase the use
of Google-owned services and the sales of Ben & Jerry's ice cream.
32. See, e.g., AAKER, supra note 10, at 75-76; IAIN ELLWOOD, THE ESSENTIAL
BRAND BOOK: OVER 100 TECHNIQUES TO INCREASE BRAND VALUE 163-78 (2d ed. 2002);
DARYL TRAvIs, EMOTIONAL BRANDING - How SUCCESSFUL BRANDS GAIN THE IRRA-
TIONAL EDGE (2000).
33. See STUART EWEN, ALL CONSUMING IMAGES 78-81 (1988); CELIA LURY, CON-
SUMER CULTURE 60-68 (1996); Sut Jhally, Advertising at the Edge of Apocalypse, in
CRITICAL STUDIES IN MEDIA COMMERCIALISM 27 (Robin Andersen & Lance Strate eds.,
2000).
34. See DALLAS W. SMYTHE, DEPENDENCY ROAD: COMMUNICATIONS, CAPITALISM,
CONSCIOUSNESS, AND CANADA 27 (1981).
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The IPOs served, in part, as another aspect of a broader marketing
strategy - developing and promoting the meaning, the "cool," of the
brand. This part of the branding effort seems perfectly consistent
with the notion, shared by critics and proponents of marketing alike,
that we live in a postmodern moment in which a multitude of signs
and products produce significant clutter through which consumers
must wade before purchase, and that the savvy corporate strategy is
to find innovative means to promote and extend the brand in as many
new contexts as possible. 35 The analysis of this type of brand exten-
sion would be identical to an analysis of branding in any other mar-
keting context, because the audience is the same - the consumer.
However, there is another audience for these branding efforts:
investors and shareholders who transact in the capital markets
rather than in the consumer marketplace. As with the decisions that
consumers make while shopping for products and services, investors
and shareholders might respond positively to branding efforts in cor-
porate deal structures; doing so, they would add value to corporate
assets and securities. Branding in this context can add value to stock
prices in two ways, one that is perfectly consistent with a rational
investor model but another that is not. Assume Corporation A per-
forms a clever, branded IPO. A savvy investor, call him Irving, sees
this effort as an effective, professional way to further the brand, and
he assumes that the IPO is further evidence of Corporation A's ability
to innovatively market itself and its products and services. Rather
than responding as a consumer, Irving responds as an investor at-
tempting to gauge how consumers would respond. Irving, and like-
minded Irvings in the market, might therefore value Corporation A's
brand equity and its potential for growth more highly, thereby driv-
ing up the price for Corporation A's securities. Irving sees the pro-
duction of cool, and he likes it.
However, suppose that Ignatz, another investor, is attracted to
Corporation A's branding efforts not as evidence of the company's
marketing abilities but because the corporate brand appeals to him
in the emotional and self-expressive manner of effective brands. Like
the "irrational" consumer who purchases a product not for its func-
tion or value but because of the brand's non-rational attractions,
35, Compare BEDBURY, supra note 23, at xiv-xv (explaining that marketing pro-
fessionals and corporate executives need to understand this "brand new world" in or-
der to succeed), with MAiTHEw P. McALLISTER, THE COMMERCIALIZATION OF AMERICAN
CULTURE 248-52 (1995) (arguing that the ubiquity of advertising and marketing have
enormous, adverse political and emotional effects), and HERBERT I. SCHILLER, CUL-
TURE, INC.: THE CORPORATE TAKEOVER OF PUBLIC EXPRESSION 135-56 (1991) (same).
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Ignatz has invested in Corporation A because of some non-rational
appeal embedded in the branded IPO. Ignatz unthinkingly buys the
"cool" of the brand rather than coolly evaluating the value of the se-
curity. Are we as comfortable with Ignatz's reason for purchasing
Corporation A stock, and that of any other Ignatzes in the market, as
we were with Irving's? When Ignatz makes this decision in the con-
sumer marketplace - for example, when he chooses inferior Product
A over Product B because he is moved by the aesthetics and emo-
tional appeal of the brand - we do not care much unless, perhaps, the
product is damaging to Ignatz's health or its inflated price drives him
to the poorhouse. However, does the analysis change when we are
thinking about capital markets rather than about markets for con-
sumer goods?
An answer to that question requires assumptions about two
things, the second of which I discuss in the next section. For now, I
want to suggest that an analysis of these practices requires adopting
or developing a theory of the audience. I do not want to imply that I
think capital markets are filled with lots of Ignatzes. However, are
they filled solely with Irvings? Is the investor and shareholder audi-
ence fully cognizant of the effects of branding on its decision-making?
Further, even if members of this audience are fully cognizant of the
company's branding efforts, are these investors and shareholders
nevertheless affected by them? Perhaps investors and shareholders
practice a form of postmodern "cynical reason" in which they recog-
nize and even mock firms' efforts to puff themselves and manipulate
stock prices. However, these knowing investors and shareholders
nevertheless incorporate this puffery and manipulation in their deci-
sions to buy, sell, and hold.36 This is one reading of the dot-com bub-
ble, and other instances of wildly inflated markets, in which the
cynically reasoning investor thinks: I know I am speculating. I know
that the price of the asset I am purchasing is vastly over-inflated. And
I know that the market in which I am purchasing it is risky, over-
heated, and perhaps even irrationally exuberant. But I will neverthe-
less buy, and smirk, wink, and nod about what I have done. I may be
part of an irrationally exuberant market, but at least I know that I'm
irrationally exuberant.37
36. See PETER SLOTERDIJK, CRITIQUE OF CYNICAL REASON 5 (Michael Eldred
trans., 1987); SLAVOJ ZIZEK, THE SUBLIME OBJECT OF IDEOLOGY 33 (1989).
37. This is idle speculation on my part; I do not know of an academic analysis of
the dot-com bubble that sees its frenzy as knowing and cynical. However, it is the
funny but disturbing depiction of capital markets and IPOs that emerges from
Jonathan Franzen's novel The Corrections, in which the role of the attorney in provid-
ing "caveating" disclosures in a road-show meeting for potential investors is portrayed
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These questions ultimately raise the specter of the irrational in-
vestor, the figure whose discovery has called into question the effi-
cient capital market hypothesis (ECMH) and its assumption that
security prices always "fully reflect" the available information and
the securities' fundamental values. 38 I will not rehearse the ECMH
or its critiques here except to suggest that, if the branding mini-trend
continues in IPOs, particular instances of branding may produce dif-
fering expectations among investors (the Ignatzes and the Irvings)
and may trigger particular types of cultural biases and behavioral
heuristics that would inflate stock prices - biases and heuristics that
may not, in turn, be merely random errors that cancel each other out
or be corrected by arbitrageurs. 39 Moreover, if securities laws pro-
duce an "overload" of information that investors are unable to process
thoroughly and rationally,40 investors might over-rely on the con-
densed communication supplied by the brand - which, as noted ear-
lier, is at once remarkably simple and efficient, as well as
exceptionally symbolic and evocative.
In short, if the effort to brand the deal creates value, then an
analysis of that effort will need a better, more precise sense of how
and where that value is created. To do that, the analysis will need a
more developed theory of the brand as it works in this context, and a
more sensitive means to track the audiences that the brand reaches
and how it affects them. It would have to rely on a theory of the
audience that needs development and testing.
CORPORATE TRANSPARENCY
The other assumption needed to evaluate whether an investor is
a shrewd Irving or a manipulated Ignatz concerns the relationship
between the information produced by the branding component of
these deals and other information produced by the company. Federal
securities laws and other federal and state regulatory schemes oblige
a corporation to disclose certain types of information to investors,
shareholders, the public, and government agencies at certain times in
as a kind of hip snake-oil salesman who peppers his statements with the phrase,
"wink wink wink." JONATHAN FRANZEN, THE CORRECTIONS 206-07 (2001).
38. Eugene F. Fama, Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empiri-
cal Work, 25 J. FIN. 383, 387 (1970); Ronald J. Gilson & Reiner H. Kraakman, The
Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70 VA. L. REV. 549, 565-92 (1984).
39. A particularly good summary of critiques of the ECMH is Lynn A. Stout, The
Mechanisms of Market Inefficiency: An Introduction to the New Finance, 28 J. CORP.
L. 635 (2003).
40. See Troy A. Paredes, Blinded by the Light: Information Overload and Its Con-
sequences for Securities Regulation, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 417 (2003).
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certain ways. 4 1 At least in theory, these requirements inform invest-
ment decisions, allow shareholders to hold management accountable,
enable consumers to make better decisions, and ensure regulatory
compliance. 4 2 Indeed, the information disclosure requirements of se-
curities laws assume that by forcing transparency on the market and
correcting informational asymmetries, they maximize capital market
efficiency.43 If one assumes that branding corporate deals and infra-
structure would have little or no effect on the information available to
investors and shareholders, or that this audience is filled with Irv-
ings who can ignore or correctly interpret the branding message and
thus invest rationally, then branding appears to be a benign enter-
prise. However, if one assumes that branding in this context can cir-
cumvent or at least push back against efforts to require or encourage
transparency by obfuscating informational disclosures, then brand-
ing is a cause for concern.
Interestingly, the anecdotal use of branding in IPOs comes at the
same time that corporate governance activists have increasingly, and
to greater effect, called for companies to disclose their operations as
fully and honestly as possible to their shareholders and to the world
at large. 4 4 In the same way that the branding increment presumably
creates value for the company, so the affirmative steps that the ideal
"transparent" corporation takes to demonstrate its openness and so-
cial responsibility would, according to advocates, satisfy the greater
demand of consumers and investors for trustworthy companies and
41. For an overview of the disclosures required under securities law, see, for ex-
ample, Robert B. Thompson & Hillary A. Sale, Securities Fraud as Corporate Govern-
ance: Reflections Upon Federalism, 56 VAND. L. REV. 859, 869-86 (2003); for some
historical analysis, see, e.g., HOMER KRIPKE, THE SEC AND CORPORATE DISCLOSURE:
REGULATION IN SEARCH OF A PURPOSE (1979) and George J. Bentsen, Required Disclo-
sure and the Stock Market: An Evaluation of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 63
AM. ECON. REV. 132 (1973); and for the most recent effort to regulate by disclosure,
see Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002). On regula-
tion through disclosure, see, e.g., TRANSPARENCY IN PUBLIC POLICY (Neal D. Finkel-
stein ed., 2000); Cass R. Sunstein, Informing America: Risk, Disclosure, and the First
Amendment, 20 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 653, 662-65 (1993).
42. Elsewhere I have challenged this consequentialist conception of trans-
parency. See Mark Fenster, The Opacity of Transparency, 91 IOWA L. REV. 885 (2006).
For purposes of this essay, I will assume this conception has some validity, although I
question it below.
43. If we question the ECMH's assumption that we can know when price and
value are equal and when a market is efficient, however, we also need to question
when disclosure laws (or, in their absence, voluntary disclosure) have made a market
transparent. See David A. Westbrook, Telling All: The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the
Ideal of Transparency, 2004 MICH. ST. L. REV. 441, 450.
44. See generally DON TAPscoTT & DAVID TICOLL, THE NAKED CORPORATION: How
THE AGE OF TRANSPARENCY WILL REVOLUTIONIZE BUSINESS (2003).
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thereby create what might be seen as a transparency and responsibil-
ity increment.45 These two movements do not necessarily contradict
each other; indeed, one school of contemporary branding holds that
with increased pressure on corporate transparency and responsibility
comes a need for brands that offer "substance, not hype; honesty
rather than hypocrisy."46
Put that way, an attorney should be wary when the branding
effort to hunt and develop cool produces "hype" rather than "sub-
stance," and "hypocrisy" rather than the "honesty" that the various
applicable legal and regulatory regimes require. This is especially
the case when such "hype" and "hypocrisy" are likely to affect deci-
sions made in the capital markets. This assumes, of course, that an
attorney can determine the substance and honesty of the branding
that she embeds in the deal. This again demonstrates the impor-
tance of developing a better understanding of the branding process,
or at least of recognizing its risks, as well as a more thorough under-
standing of how that brand will affect its intended and unintended
audiences.
MASTERCARD
The MasterCard case study appears to suggest further complica-
tions to the dynamics I have outlined. The central branding element,
at least as it relates to the deal's consumer (as opposed to investor)
audience, is the charitable foundation established by the IPO that
will hold approximately 18% of Class A voting shares, and the foun-
dation's purported relationship to MasterCard's "Priceless" cam-
paign. I agree with Fleischer that this effort seems unlikely to
45. See Joshua A. Newberg, Corporate Codes of Ethics, Mandatory Disclosure,
and the Market for Ethical Conduct, 29 VT. L. REV. 253, 289-91 (2005). I am merely
describing current trends in theories of corporate governance rather than arguing in
favor of or against them; nor am I arguing about the legal permissibility of corporate
management engaging in activities that do not maximize profit. For representative
arguments regarding the latter issue, compare STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORA-
TION LAw AND ECONOMICS 419-29 (2002) (summarizing the legal and normative argu-
ments as to why fiduciary duties require corporate managers to maximize corporate
profits in order to further the interests of shareholders), with Einer Elhauge, Sacrific-
ing Corporate Profits in the Public Interest, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 733 (2005) (arguing that
corporate managers have discretion to engage in practices that sacrifice corporate
profits for the public interest).
46. BEDBURY, supra note 23, at xv, 169; see also MARC GOBS, CITIZEN BRAND: 10
COMMANDMENTS FOR TRANSFORMING BRANDS IN A CONSUMER DEMOCRACY xxxi (2002)
(arguing that in contemporary society, and especially following the 9/11 attacks, cor-
porations and their brands must emphasize "the values of honor, integrity, family
commitments, cultural decency, and trust - anything that has to do with being a good
citizen").
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succeed without a clear direction for the charitable foundation and
without efforts both to promote the foundation and tie its work to the
brand. I see only a marginal association between the "priceless" con-
cept, which ingeniously allows us to recognize the limits of consump-
tion even as it promotes the use of a credit card, and the work of a
charitable foundation. The deal seems to lack the ingenuity of the
Google IPO's use of technology and innovation, which synchronized
well with Google's brand values, and it lacks Ben & Jerry's clever use
of localism and of the positive associations that its national customer
base was likely to have with Vermont.
Because the branding effort seems so half-hearted and unrelated
to the existing campaign to market MasterCard, it is difficult to see
any potential Irving/Ignatz or manipulated investor problems here.
Very little seems emotional or magical about the charitable founda-
tion as it is constituted. Instead, it seems like an obviously instru-
mental, possibly cynical move to avoid regulatory penalties and
oversight. 47 As such, there appears very little risk of potential inves-
tors falling prey to the direct seduction of the brand, or to the cynical
reason that knows it is being seduced but that nevertheless acts as
though seduction has occurred. This merely provokes the question of
why the company is going to all this trouble - surely there were
other, less costly means to insulate the company from the short-
sighted, hostile outside interests that it fears.
However, besides what appears to be its failure as a branding
effort, the MasterCard case foregrounds an issue that appeared un-
important or irrelevant in the earlier discussion - the fact that regu-
latory bodies may be an additional audience for a branding effort.
Fleischer implies that the charitable foundation wraps the company's
efforts to engineer both a solution to their regulatory problem and a
means for ownership control in the pretty paper of social responsibil-
ity. Unfortunately, however, this effort seems so patently obvious
that, at least one hopes, only a thoroughly dense or captured regula-
tor would forego imposing antitrust liability simply because the IPO
offered penance in the form of a charitable foundation or reverber-
ated with that charming "Priceless" campaign.
One can imagine, then, that the MasterCard IPO's branding ef-
forts may lead to one or more results that prove sub-optimal. Per-
haps the IPO itself will fail or will leave money on the table because
investors are wary of the complexity of the deal, of the likelihood that
47. It does not help matters that the IPO would organize the foundation in Ca-
nada rather than in the U.S. because of favorable tax laws.
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MasterCard will be unable to escape antitrust liability, and espe-
cially of the expense and the oddity, at least in the U.S., of the chari-
table foundation. Perhaps the charitable foundation itself will fail to
advance the brand in any significant way, and will ultimately appear
more like a very expensive anti-takeover measure than a contributor
to the "Priceless" campaign or to the next iteration of MasterCard's
effort to brand itself as a more soulful credit card with greater integ-
rity than its competitors. If either possibility proves true, a longitudi-
nal case study could ultimately offer some important lessons for legal
coolhunting. The less interesting and significant possibility is the ba-
nal conclusion that branding is difficult and sometimes fails to in-
crease a product's value. The other prospect - which would make
Fleischer's work more significant and helpful for the legal profession
- is that sometimes the hunter gets the cool, and sometimes the
hunter returns empty-handed. In that case, we need to ask why
these variable results, and at what cost to the client and to society do
they come?
CONCLUSION
Coolhunting is, well, cool. In Gibson's novel, Cayce Pollard is the
very epitome of cool, shunning commodification - she eschews all
brands in her private life and personal style, going so far as to cut all
of the labels from her plain, sleek, and expensive clothing - while she
extends the reach and persuasive capacity of advertising and con-
sumer goods in the lives of others. And the novel never fully resolves
this tension. Cayce uses the enormous resources put at her disposal
by the elite advertising and marketing agency that employs her to
track down the source of a text that resists commodification, an elu-
sive cult film with which she is obsessed that is being freely but care-
fully released in brief fragments on the Internet by some unknown
person or persons. She chases this text because of her own fascina-
tion with it, but her client hires her, she fears, because it wants to
capture the text and learn how to use its mode of distribution to sell
consumer goods. Simple tales of commodification either tell us that
it's all bad, because it exploits us and degrades human existence, or
that it's mostly good, because it enables the mass production of things
that enhance our capacity to live and enjoy life, and because it ex-
pands societal wealth. Pattern Recognition smartly rejects such sim-
ple narratives. Most of its characters ultimately get what they want
- Cayce emerges wealthier and wiser but still cool, individualized,
and able to live outside the mass culture she so instinctively under-
stands; her employer apparently is able to expand its business
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(though it remains unclear precisely why or how); and the mysterious
film is allowed to remain an un-commodified, cult object. However,
this exception relies on and proves the rule. Cayce's talent remains
viable, the agency is more powerful than ever, and so the cool re-
mains endangered and the mass remains vulnerable to increasingly
sophisticated tools of manipulation.
Pattern Recognition is middlebrow genre fiction for hip sci-fi,
noirish nerds, and its ending fulfills the fantasies of the urban profes-
sionals (like me) who read it. We want to believe that one can make
peace with commodification, that we can live successfully and hap-
pily, if only ironically, as classically liberal individuals in a world in
which we define ourselves by brands and marketed lifestyles. Its am-
bivalence at once embraces the cool and eschews the mass consumer
culture that allows the cool to exist. Its fantasy is that the cool's ex-
ploitation of the mass comes without cost, and that the boundaries
between cool and mass are stable and well-protected.
Coolhunting the law is also a kind of fantasy for attorneys seek-
ing to avoid their status as monkeyfucking scribes. 48 Like Cayce Pol-
lard, who is uneasy with her abilities and the world it helps bring
into being, I am ambivalent about coolhunting as a tool of legal prac-
tice. It certainly promises a more creative, fulfilling set of tasks for
transactional attorneys and, when it works, can add value for clients.
However, just as there is no magical Cayce Pollard in the real world
of marketing who can say in advance whether a brand will succeed,
so there is no risk-free branding for attorneys and their clients. Some
efforts won't work, and may as a result render the corporate deal that
emerges less valuable. When it works effectively in the consumer
context, branding operates by instilling affective meaning into con-
sumer goods in order to persuade people to purchase products they
may not need at prices higher than they need to or even should
spend. Similarly, branding in the corporate context runs the risk of
rendering opaque those legal objects, securities and corporations,
that as a legal and normative matter we expect and require to be
transparent.
48. See Fleischer, supra note 8, at 139.
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